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This volume presents contributions made to a conference hosted and run by 
the research network “Crossroads Asia,” which took place in Munich in 
October 2014. The goal of the Crossroads Asia network is to enhance the 
understanding of the geographic area that stretches from eastern Iran to 
western China and from the Aral Sea to northern India. This part of Asia 
falls through the cracks of conventionally defined research areas, in that it 
is not entirely situated in South Asia, West Asia or Central Asia but inter-
sects and partly overlaps these ‘disciplinary’ regions of area studies. Never-
theless, it makes a good deal of sense to take a cross-cutting perspective, 
simply because many social and political relations and processes intersect 
and connect significant parts of these conventionally delimited areas. The 
world is not a mosaic of containers, and while the critique of methodologi-
cal nationalism (Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2002) has become widely accepted 
in academia, a critique of methodological (and disciplinary) ‘regionalism’ 
is equally necessary. Accordingly, Crossroads Asia challenges the validity 
of the traditional approach of area studies, namely of dividing the world in-
to clearly delimited segments which are then examined by specialised and 
institutionalised disciplines, for example ‘South Asian Studies’ or ‘Central 
Asian Studies’, without looking much beyond these limits. In contrast, 
Crossroads Asia’s counter-approach proposes to carry out research against 
the grain of conventionally defined areas, following dynamics that do not 
necessarily stop at the borders of nation states or areas.  
Mobility is a key dynamic in this regard: people, as well as goods and 
ideas, are extremely mobile in the areas under study, in spite of an envi-
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ronment characterised by high mountain systems and deserts, which for 
outsiders rather seem to inhibit or even foreclose movement. Nevertheless, 
it is not only physical movements, such as migration, trade, nomadism and 
other forms of “wayfaring” (Ingold 2009), which are central in this regard. 
The network also departs from an understanding of the social that is centred 
on processes and emphasises social mobility and movement. Processual 
dynamics and social movements are, in most cases, intimately connected 
with conflicts; indeed, the area studied by the Crossroads network is one of 
the most conflict-ridden parts of the world. For instance, one just has to 
think of the civil war in Tajikistan, the Kashmir conflict between India and 
Pakistan and the insurgency and ongoing protest in the Kashmir Valley 
against Indian control, the conflict in Afghanistan and the war between the 
Taliban and the Pakistani army that is so intimately tied to the situation in 
Afghanistan. Thus, conflict has almost ‘naturally’ become a central concern 
of the Crossroads Network, albeit without limiting the focus to macro-level 
conflicts. However, macro-level conflicts form a significant context for 
contestations at the meso and micro levels; in fact, all levels intersect. Fur-
thermore, instead of focusing on states and actors, we were interested in the 
everyday life of conflicts – or rather everyday life in the context of con-
flicts. While Georg Elwert (2004) maintains that conflicts are socially em-
bedded, we emphasise that in the contexts we studied, social life is always 
embedded in conflicts.  
As Crossroad Asia’s basic approach to conflict has been laid out previ-
ously in a concept paper (Crossroads Asia Working Group Conflict 2012), I 
shall only summarise some of the major points here. First of all, conflict is 
seen as a ‘normal’ and universal aspect of social life and not as an excep-
tional occurrence and deviation away from a ‘normal’ state of social order. 
Conflicts and the necessity to deal with them are part of everyday social 
life, and they may have integrative or destructive functions for society; fur-
thermore, they are not restricted to a narrowly defined realm of politics 
(centring on issues related to the state and security). Departing from an ex-
tended concept of politics that draws on a broad concept of power as a sig-
nificant dimension of all social relations, ‘social’ conflicts are also ‘politi-
cal’. Given the situation in the areas studied, it is quite obvious that social 
relations, including relations of conflict, do not stop at the borders of the 
nation state, and so in order to conceive of the social we took inspiration 
from Norbert Elias’s concept of figurations, to which I shall return below.  
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Emphasising conflicts as processes, we are of the opinion that the 
search for the causes (and consequences, for that matter) of conflicts is of-
ten not analytically useful. In many cases it is even impossible to identify 
causes, because conflicts frequently have neither a clear beginning nor an 
end. Rather, “conflicts follow conflicts,” in that they feed into and intersect 
one another. Distinguishing between the causes of conflict, as well as for 
the purpose of analytical categorisation (‘ethnic conflicts’, ‘resource con-
flicts’, ‘religious conflicts’, etc.), often runs the danger of simplifying high-
ly complex situations regarding intersecting antagonisms. This implies that 
in the endeavour to understand conflicts, emic perspectives have to be taken 
seriously and must not be obscured by the imposition of macro-perspective 
categories like, for instance, the distinction between ‘Taliban’ and ‘civil-
ians’ in Afghanistan. Furthermore, conflicts are not simply about ‘objects 
of conflict’ but have a significant communicative dimension. Often, the 
discursive construction of a conflict is itself disputed, so we need to take 
not only symbolic action, including rituals surrounding conflicts, into ac-





The approach to conflicts suggested herein takes the conflicting actors seri-
ously. Norbert Elias was one of the first social scientists to focus on indi-
viduals as social actors. He refused to privilege or reify ‘society’ or ‘the so-
cial’ – or ‘structure’, we could say – or to separate it from the individual 
human being; rather, he emphasised the necessity to think about both to-
gether: the individual human being/actor embedded in social relationships 
and the social composed of individual human beings and resulting from 
their interaction. Elias can be seen as a precursor to later practice theory. 
For him, neither methodological individualism nor methodological holism 
was a viable option for sociology. He suggested the concept of figuration in 
order to refer to the ‘middle ground’ of social formations that come into be-
ing through the interaction of individuals and which in turn strongly influ-
ence individual action. Elias takes the example of a game of cards – or ra-
ther of individuals playing cards – in order to explain what he means by 
figuration (Elias 2009: 141f). The people playing form a figuration. Their 
interaction is interdependent, i.e. the acts of each of these individuals de-
pend on the acts of others, to which they respond and which set certain 
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conditions to which they re-act in turn. The game is not an abstraction or an 
ideal type but a concrete event and process. The game is also not reducible 
to a set of rules; it is rather the enactment and interpretation of these rules 
in the particular event of playing. The game does not exist independently of 
the playing individuals and vice versa, i.e. the individuals are not independ-
ent of this situation, as they become and are players only through their in-
teraction. Such a figuration has no fixed boundaries. While we can limit our 
view to the players, we could also take into consideration the larger space 
in which they are playing, perhaps a pub or a living room. Again, we will 
discover concrete interdependencies with other actors in this room and be-
yond, discovering larger networks of interaction. However, even if we fol-
low these interdependencies of interaction further, we trace a specific and 
concrete figuration and do not arrive at the abstraction of ‘the social’ or 
‘society’. Through tracing the figuration we learn about interdependencies 
and are able to discover connections which in the beginning might have 
been out of sight. Elias emphasises that figurations are changeable patterns 
that implicate individuals, not only intellectually, but also as ‘whole per-
sons’ (ibid. 142) – with their bodies and senses, we should add. He further 
points out that two or more groups composed of interdependent individuals 
may be intertwined in a figuration. He takes the example of two football 
teams that play against one another. The interdependencies and interactions 
of the players within each of the teams can only be understood with refer-
ence to their interactions with the opposing team. To this figuration we can 
add the spectators and fans, who in turn respond to the unfolding of the 
game on the field. We could also extend this notion by taking into account 
other football teams and their followers and arrive at the larger figuration of 
a football league – a figuration of the figurations of individual teams and 
games. Figurations are not clearly bounded but extend in space and time, 
and they cannot be defined by drawing limits but rather by pointing out 
core events and issues. The connectedness of figurations – which also im-
plies specific closures and disjunctions – corroborates Crossroads Asia’s 
emphasis of mobility and trans-border relations.  
Taking inspiration from Elias’s conceptualisation, we consider conflicts 
as figurations or as significant nodes of larger figurations where multiple 
networks of interaction and interdependency collide. Just like Elias’s ex-
ample of the football game, conflicts come into being through interacting 
individuals that form oppositions and/or alliances. Also, conflict figurations 
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branch out and extend over time and space; they have particular histories 
and connect with other issues and figurations.  
Following Latour, we cannot limit the analysis of figurations to the act-
ing individuals involved – we also have to take things, objects, into ac-
count. Elias overlooked that the players in his game of cards actually need-
ed a material deck of cards, without which they would be engaged in a very 
different activity. Similarly, objects such as a ball, goals, a field and, per-
haps even a stadium are necessary elements for the figuration of a football 
game. Just as Elias refused to strictly separate ‘the social’ from ‘the indi-
vidual’, Latour refuses to separate ‘human beings’ from ‘non-human be-
ings’. This is highly relevant for the analysis of conflicts, as they have their 
own material conditions and paraphernalia. Take Latour’s famous example 
of the gun: a human being with a gun is not the same as a human being 
without a gun. Although the gun does nothing by itself (shoot people), the 
possession of a gun transforms the human being; it changes the range of ac-
tion (Latour 2002: 214ff). People carrying guns and who interact with one 
another form a quite different configuration than people without guns. Yet 
the significance of material things for conflicts is not limited to the obvious 
case of weapons. Other things such as roads, mobile phones and cars equal-
ly play significant roles in figurations, figurations of conflict included, and 
they enable different ways to perform the action, extend the range of action 
and transform actors in various ways. Many such things in particular trans-
form the relation of actors and agents with space, in that they enable the 
bridging of distance and facilitate the connection between distant places, or 
they reduce the time needed to do so. Thus, they enable the extension of 
figurations.  
Given the particular emphasis of the Crossroads Asia network on ques-
tions of mobility and space, I will focus on these issues in the rest of this in-
troduction, departing from the discussion of a conflict which I have fol-
lowed, more or less continuously, over the last two and a half decades, 
namely the conflict between Sunnis and Shias in Gilgit, the capital city of 
the high mountain area of Gilgit-Baltistan, to which Emma Varley’s  
chapter in this collection also refers. This conflict can be viewed as a local 
figuration that overlaps with other figurations in time and space and  
which also has strong effects on local space, transforming, in fact,  
spatial organisation.  
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CONFLICT, SPACE AND MOBILITY: SHIAS AND SUNNIS 
IN GILGIT
 
Everyday life in Gilgit is strongly affected by Sunni-Shia violence. Since 
the late 1980s, periods of violence, which are known locally as tensions, 
have occurred every few years, or sometimes even more frequently. In 
2012, for instance, there were three periods of tensions. In contrast to earli-
er cases, the events of violence that produced tensions did not happen in 
Gilgit town itself, but Shia passengers were attacked on buses coming from 
or going to Gilgit on the Karakorum Highway (in February and May 2012) 
or near the Babusar Pass (in September 2012). Nevertheless, these attacks 
had strong repercussions in the town. Because counter-violence is expected 
after such attacks, curfews are imposed on the town which often last for 
several weeks. Life in Gilgit comes to a halt. Traffic on the Karakorum 
Highway, the lifeline on which Gilgit-Baltistan depends for the supply of 
food and other essentials, is closed or strongly restricted. The bazaar is 
closed and people have to live for days on whatever they happen to store in 
their houses. Even when, after some time, the curfew is relaxed or lifted, 
movement remains restrained, as people fear further violence. The atmos-
phere in the town remains very tense, and often it takes weeks or even 
months until life becomes ‘normal’ again.  
The conflict between Shias and Sunnis in Gilgit does not have a definite 
beginning, although in local discourse 1988 is often given as the year in 
which the troubles started. Nonetheless, this year marks the escalation of 
Sunni-Shia violence rather than the actual beginning of the conflict. Of 
course, the Shia-Sunni issue originates in the dispute about the succession 
of the Prophet Mohammad and is therefore almost as old as Islam itself. 
Shia-Sunni antagonism is a global concomitant of Islam that has diverse lo-
cal manifestations. In Gilgit-Baltistan, for instance, the two sects are une-
venly distributed area-wise. This spatial distribution of Shias and Sunnis 
(and Ismailis, the third Muslim sect in Gilgit-Baltistan, which is not directly 
involved in the antagonism) originates from the differential Islamisation of 
the region. Roughly, Sunni missionaries came from the south, Shias from 
the East and Ismailis from the North. Thus, very roughly, the south of 
Gilgit-Baltistan, Diamer District, is purely Sunni, while to the east, Bal-
tistan, is mostly – though not exclusively – Shia, while the northern part of 
the area, Hunza, is mostly Ismaili. Gilgit town is mixed and surrounded by 
villages populated by members of all sects. ‘Mixed’ does not mean that the 
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sects are evenly distributed throughout the town; rather, Shias and Sunnis 
are concentrated in particular areas, and mixed neighbourhoods are actually 
the great exception. This spatial configuration of Shias and Sunnis living in 
close proximity, and yet in separate – and often spatially opposed – neigh-
bourhoods of the town, is probably one significant precondition that has 
been highly conducive to the escalation of the conflict. Increasing spatial 
separation, however, is also a significant outcome of conflict.  
In local discourse, people mostly emphasise that there was no conflict 
“in the past,” that Shias and Sunnis were closely related, marriages includ-
ed, that they lived amicably side by side and that in many cases one even 
did not know whether a person was Shia or Sunni. Two dichotomies (be-
side the Shia-Sunni dichotomy itself) dominate the discourse about sectari-
an conflict in Gilgit, both of which support one another: past vs. present 
and inside vs. outside. While the past was peaceful, the present is violent. 
Similarly, it is said that people from Gilgit are peaceful, and it was in fact 
outsiders who brought conflict and violence to the area. Taken together, 
both dichotomies rather exonerate the local people of Gilgit, in that they are 
not responsible for Sunni-Shia violence that has befallen the town over the 
last decades. When I first started fieldwork in Gilgit, in 1991, I was told 
that Shias and Sunnis had even prayed together in the same mosque. The 
beginning of the separation of Shias and Sunnis in ritual gatherings was at-
tributed to Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan, who was the Wazir-e-Wazarat 
(Governor) of the Maharaja in Gilgit in the first decade of the 20th century. 
I was told that the same mosque in Gilgit’s bazaar was used by Shias and 
Sunnis for prayer, but that the governor initiated the construction of a Shia 
Imambarga, a hall which Shias use especially for the commemoration of the 
martyrdom of the Imam Hussain during Muharram, the month of mourning. 
Thus, separate places were allocated to Sunnis and Shias, though they still 
often shared mosques until the 1970s.  
The first incidents of violence occurred in the 1970s. On Ashura, the 
10th of the month of Muharram, Shias mourn the martyrdom of the Imam 
Hussain in Kerbela in 680 in a public julus (procession). Ashura mourning 
practices include self-flagellation (zanjiri matam). The julus used to end in 
a reunion at the central bazaar of Gilgit, in front of the Sunni jama masjid 
(main mosque). In 1972, the Qazi of the Sunni protested against the assem-
bly in this place, arguing that the julus disturbed prayer in the mosque and 
that the blood of the Shias defiled the space around the building. The Shias, 
however, refused to change the course of the Ashura julus. The dispute con-
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tinued over the following years. In 1975, the Shia julus was shot at from the 
Sunni mosque. The Sunni Qazi was arrested, following which armed Sun-
nis from Kohistan and Diamer marched towards Gilgit, in order to free the 
Qazi. Similarly, armed Shias started out from Nager, in order to defend 
Shias in Gilgit. Both groups were stopped by local paramilitary troops, the 
Gilgit Scouts, before they reached the town. In the following years, the ad-
ministration did not allow the Shias to assemble in front of the Sunni 
mosque. As the Shias refused to gather at another place, the julus was pro-
hibited for the next two years, until the Shias gave in. Muharram remains a 
very tense time in Gilgit up to today. The bloodshed that was prevented in 
1975 occurred in 1988. In this year, Shias ended Ramadan, the month of 
fasting, a day earlier than the Sunnis. While Sunnis were still fasting, young 
Shia men rejoiced in the main bazaar, by smoking and eating. The Sunnis 
felt deeply offended, there was a local fight and when the news of this 
reached the Sunni areas of Diamer and Kohistan, armed lashkar (‘warri-
ors’) again made their way toward Gilgit. This time they were not stopped, 
as the Gilgit Scouts in the interim period had been disbanded and the regu-
lar army would take no action. The Sunni lashkar did not enter Gilgit town 
but devastated Shia villages, such as Jalalabad and Sakwar, close to the 
town. 
Why did the dispute over the julus develop in the 1970s? Many people 
in Gilgit – Shias, Sunnis and Ismailis alike – draw a line from politics to re-
ligion. In early 1971, the town saw a brief but massive uprising against the 
Pakistani domination of the area. A minor dispute between a local teacher 
and a Punjabi army officer grew into the open expression of discontent with 
the area’s political status: having been part of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir before the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Gilgit-Baltistan 
was (and still is) under Pakistani control and administration, yet it was not a 
constitutional part of the country and lacked any representation in the Paki-
stani political setup (Sökefeld 2005). There was a huge demonstration. In 
order to free a political leader who had been arrested, the police station in 
Gilgit was stormed and then set on fire. The Gilgit Scouts refused to use 
force to control the situation, and finally troops from outside were called in 
to put down the insurgency. Thereafter, Sunni ulema from outside came to 
Gilgit and started to preach against Shias, calling them ‘apostates’ and 
‘non-Muslims’. For many people in Gilgit it made perfect sense that these 
ulema were brought in by the government in order to execute a divide-and-
rule strategy, that is, to pit Sunnis against Shias, in order to prevent further 
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united mobilisation against Pakistan’s control. Although this allegation 
cannot be proven, it is a clear indication of mistrust vis-à-vis the govern-
ment of Pakistan. In any case, since the mid-1970s, alienation between Shi-
as and Sunnis has grown into inter-sectarian violence.  
The events of 1988 ruptured Shia-Sunni relations and had long-lasting 
effects. While before, Shia-Sunni relations had been one issue among oth-
ers in the town, the sectarian antagonism now became a premise for social 
life in Gilgit. Segregation, spatial as well as social, between both groups in-
creased, and Shias living in villages close to the town or in parts of the city 
where they were in a minority position – and therefore allegedly vulnerable 
to further attack by Sunnis – moved to other places that were inhabited by a 
Shia or Ismaili majority and which felt safe. Similarly, Sunnis also concen-
trated in Sunni areas. In effect, villages and neighbourhoods became un-
mixed, and nowadays, in periods of tension, people will often, for weeks, 
refuse to go to their workplaces if these happen to be in a majority area of 
the other sect. In her contribution to this volume, Emma Varley vividly de-
scribes the grave effects of these dynamics of vulnerability and separation 
on the health sector in Gilgit. A similar dynamic applies to schools, where-
by parents send their children to institutes that they consider safe because 
they are situated in a neighbourhood dominated by their own sect. Thus, 
many schools become increasingly homogeneous in terms of the sectarian 
affiliation of their students. In acute periods of tension, people even avoid 
moving through areas dominated by the other sect. Moreover, in 2012, after 
the bus attacks mentioned earlier, public transport in Gilgit was separated 
according to sect, although this was stopped by the government after just a 
few days (Grieser/Sökefeld 2015). Together with this increasing spatial 
separation of Shias and Sunnis comes a growing social distance between 
the two sects, due in part to the fact that for almost three decades no cross-
sectarian marriages have been concluded. Many people have relatives in the 
other sect, yet social contact has decreased greatly. Everyday life is increas-
ingly sectarianised, meaning that sectarian affiliation becomes significant in 
more and more areas of life (Grieser/Sökefeld 2015: 83).  
The social dynamics of sectarianisation can be described succinctly 
through Leo Kuper’s concept of polarisation. Kuper uses the concept for  
 
“an intensification of conflict by aggressive action and reaction. Polarization, then, 
is a process of increasing aggregation of the members of the society into exclusive 
and mutually hostile groups, entailing the elimination of the middle-ground and of 
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mediating relationships. Episodes of conflict accumulate. There are corresponding 
ideologies […] presenting simplified conceptions of the society as already polarized 
into two antagonistic groups with incompatible and irreconcilable interests, render-
ing inevitable the resort to violence.” (Kuper 1977: 128)  
 
Although sectarian violence is not a daily affair in Gilgit, in the sense that 
somebody is attacked or killed every day, events of violence and conflict 
have mounted up due to growing antagonism and separation. Both groups 
rely on (religious) ideologies that legitimise this antagonism and interpret 
the violent action of the other group as a validation of their own position. 
Most importantly, the ‘middle-ground’ has been largely erased in Gilgit – 
both spatially and in terms of intermediate social relations. In fact, few 
places are left where Shias and Sunnis interact on a daily basis. To some 
extent the central bazaar is one such place, although customers tend to fre-
quent ‘same-sect’ shops if they are not looking for specialised goods. None-
theless, the bazaar is also seen as a very dangerous area, and it is the first 
place that people vacate unanimously when violence occurs. Another place 
of cross-sectarian interaction is Gilgit’s university, the Karakorum Interna-
tional University (KIU), which struggles to keep sectarianism out of its pre-
cincts, and not always successfully. In 2012 and 2013, for instance, Shia 
students celebrated yom-e-Hussain (the day of the Imam Hussain) in com-
memoration of the martyrdom of the third Shia Imam at the university, in 
reaction to which Sunni students protested. In 2012, clashes followed, and 
in both years the KIU was closed for a number weeks, in order to prevent 
further escalation. A ‘sectarian logic’ is forced on the university and on 
other institutions. In an article, Nosheen Ali describes how the university is 
pressurised into maintaining a ‘sectarian balance’ in terms of employment 
or prizes awarded, whereby all three sects, Ismailis included, have to be 
considered on equal terms, in order to avoid protests (Ali 2010: 744f). This 
sectarian logic has become a premise for social life, an a priori notion that 
shapes the perception of events, so that every incident of violence that oc-
curs is first interpreted within the Shia-Sunni framework: if the victim is a 
Shia, it is assumed that the perpetrator is a Sunni, or the other way round, 
until it often turns out that the incident was perhaps a family issue com-
pletely unrelated to sectarianism.  
The sectarian logic is pervasive. Although most inhabitants of the town 
regret this state of affairs, and only a few people in Gilgit are die-hard par-
tisans in relation to their own sect, they cannot escape the separating dy-
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namics of polarisation. Sectarian ‘un-mixing’ is not produced by bureau-
cratic efforts or by the coordinated use of violence for this purpose, as in 
cases of “ethnic cleansing” (e.g. Hayden 1996) – it occurs rather as a kind 
of self-organisation that is driven by sentiments of fear and insecurity. In 
spite of the strong dynamics of polarisation, there are always actors who try 
to overcome the sectarian divide and who exert great effort in working to-
wards reconciliation; yet, they often also succumb to sectarian logic. Thus, 
Nosheen Ali points out that it was a peace jirga (peace council) that forced 
the ‘sectarian balance’ on KIU and demanded that members of all sects 
have to be equally represented in the awards process. Interestingly, it is es-
pecially the ‘nationalists’ of Gilgit-Baltistan, i.e. those political groups that 
strongly criticise Pakistan’s control over the area and that demand real au-
tonomy or even independence, that most openly reject sectarian logic. For 
them, the imposition of sectarian logic is a nefarious strategy of control that 
goes way beyond ‘divide and rule’ tactics, as violence and insecurity pro-
vide a convincing legitimisation to tighten the surveillance, control and mil-
itarisation of the area further (Ali 2013).  
 
 
SECTARIANISM IN GILGIT AS FIGURATION
 
Sectarianism in Gilgit can be read as a figuration in which many issues 
overlap and interconnect. It is of course a much more complex figuration 
than Norbert Elias’s simple example of the games of cards or football, as 
sectarianism draws on a long history of Shia-Sunni antagonism in Islam, 
though it is not reducible purely to this particular issue. Shia-Sunni antago-
nism is not a pre-existing coercive structure that leaves individual actors no 
choice but to fight each other; rather, sectarian logic, which today indeed 
has acquired a certain coercive power – especially as a cognitive frame-
work of interpretation –, developed over time as a consequence of the ac-
cumulation of conflict interaction and experience. Individual actors act in 
response to the actions of members of their own and of the other sect, in-
cluding their expectations of the actions of others. Thus, the un-mixing of 
Shias and Sunnis is a consequence of the experience of insecurity and the 
expectation of further violence. It had the consequence of erasing a middle-
ground where members of both sects could meet and interact beyond the 
premise of antagonism. The dynamic of polarisation, once triggered, is dif-
ficult to stop.  
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Also, in the figuration of Sunni-Shia violence, material things are a sig-
nificant part of the game. This is most obvious in the case of automatic 
weapons, which are used in events of violence and without which the esca-
lation of the antagonism would have been impossible. Since the 1990s, 
Sunni-Shia resentment has been linked discursively to the so-called ‘Kal-
ashnikov culture’ that prevailed in many parts of Pakistan. Nowadays, one 
could speak instead of a ‘bomb culture’ that haunts the country, and recent-
ly grenades have also been used in Shia-Sunni violence in Gilgit. Besides 
weapons, infrastructure and means of transportation also play a significant 
role, both as transport for attackers – the violence of 1988 would not have 
been possible without cars – and as targets for attack. Thus, in 2012, Shias 
were assaulted on buses while passing through Sunni areas. Perhaps the 
most important implements for the conflict today are mobile phones, as at-
tacks are coordinated through mobile communication. Young men especial-
ly, who have to pass through areas dominated by the other sect, are highly 
suspicious of mobiles: when they see somebody starting to talk on the 
phone while they are passing by, they often change their route or even abort 
their trip altogether, because they fear that someone might have been alert-
ed of their approach, in order to shoot them. Furthermore, mobile commu-
nication enables the easy circulation of news and rumours that may trigger 
further violence. The attack on Shia passengers travelling on buses on the 
Karakorum Highway by people of Chilas, the Sunni town in the south of 
Gilgit, in April 2012, was triggered by the rather exaggerated ‘news’ spread 
by text messages that many Sunnis had been killed at a demonstration in 
Gilgit. When violence occurs, the authorities therefore usually shut down 
mobile services, just as they close down or at least strictly control traffic on 
the Karakorum highway. Such measures, however, add to the atmosphere 
of insecurity, as it becomes more difficult to get reliable information and 
also because the supply of provisions is stopped and becomes precarious.  
Importantly, the figuration of Sunni-Shia conflict in Gilgit intersects 
and overlaps with other issues, most significantly with the dispute about the 
political status of the area. While any involvement of state and government 
in the triggering of violence cannot be verified, the discursive intersection 
of politics and the Shia-Sunni issue has very practical results. Local elec-
tions, for instance, generally follow the sectarian logic, and often candi-
dates quite explicitly use sectarian affiliation as a means of mobilising sup-
port. Furthermore, as I pointed out previously, governmental efforts to curb 
Sunni-Shia violence add to the militarisation and control of the area by all 
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kinds of ‘security’ agencies, which strongly add to a widespread feeling of 
insecurity, marginalisation and disenfranchising domination by Pakistan.  
It noteworthy that the Shia-Sunni figuration emerges not only from the 
action of those who somehow actively take part in the antagonism, as per-
petrators of violence or as producers of sectarian discourse as preachers in 
mosques, for instance, but also the figuration creates a ‘space of conflict’ in 
Gilgit in which everyday life takes place – a space of conflict in the dual 
sense of physical space, as a series of places in which people live and 
through which they pass, and of social space, made up of social positions 
and relationships that people occupy and spin through their interaction. In 
their daily action, in most realms of life, people in the town have to take in-
to account the conflict and the pervasive logic of sectarianism and repro-
duce it accordingly. People’s actions are not determined, but their choices 
are limited by the conflict in regards to where they move in the town, to 
which school they send their children, which doctor they see in case of ill-
ness, where they look for possible marriage partners – all of which is af-
fected by sectarian considerations. To allude to Georg Elwert again, social 
life in Gilgit is embedded in this space of sectarian conflict.  
Nevertheless, the Shia-Sunni figuration in Gilgit goes beyond the local 
space of conflict and connects with sectarianism in other places in Pakistan. 
Politics in Pakistan, most importantly the politics of Islamisation that was 
executed by General Zia ul Haq after 1979 and which solely promoted a 
specific Sunni interpretation of Islam, have strongly fostered Gilgit Shias’ 
self-perception of being marginalised and being constantly under threat. In 
Pakistan, anti-Shia violence is not limited to Gilgit-Baltistan. In recent 
years, for instance, especially Shias in Baluchistan, most of them Hazaras 
originating from Afghanistan, have become victims of merciless massacres. 
In November 2013, clashes emerged around the Ashura procession in Ra-
walpindi, which resulted in severe violence in which at least eight persons 
were killed and many more injured. Often, people in Gilgit-Baltistan react 
to such incidents. After the Rawalpindi attacks, there was a huge demon-
stration in the Sunni town Chilas protesting against Shia attacks on a Sunni 
mosque and madrasa in Rawalpindi. At the same time, Shias in Gilgit con-
demned attacks on a Shia imambarga in Rawalpindi. Both a Sunni and a 
Shia party called for a “shutter-down strike,” and bazaars in Gilgit and Chi-
las were closed. The authorities also blocked traffic on the Karakorum 
Highway, in order to prevent retaliatory violence.  
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Furthermore, Shias and Sunnis in Gilgit are embedded in far-reaching 
religious networks. This is not a new development; in fact, the ideological 
separation of Sunnis and Shias is largely the consequence of the increasing 
translocal connection of their ulema (religious scholars) to their respective 
centres of learning. Sunnis in Gilgit are today almost exclusively followers 
of the School of Deoband – a relationship which dates back to the 1920s 
when, for the first time, two Sunnis from the Gilgit area went to study at the 
famous madrasa in the north Indian town of Deoband and subsequently 
taught their version of Islam in Gilgit. For Shias, the decisive relation is 
with Iran. In 1937, an Iranian alim (scholar) who settled in the town initiat-
ed the construction of the present-day Shia jama masjid and became its first 
imam (Sökefeld 1997: 187f). Subsequently, almost all Shia ulema from 
Gilgit have been to Iran for religious studies, and as a consequence of the 
greater centralisation of Shia Islam, almost all Shias in Gilgit have personal 
connections to Iran because they are muqallidun (followers, implying a re-
lation of personal faithfulness) of a Shia ayatollah in the country. The Shia 
networks connect what in area studies are usually separated as South and 
West Asia.  
Another overarching context in which the Shia-Sunni issue is embedded 
is the Kashmir conflict. I have already pointed out that the Shia-Sunni con-
flict is locally interpreted with reference to the specific political predica-
ment of Gilgit-Baltistan as being controlled by Pakistan, which is based on 
the Kashmir dispute. Yet, the conflict in Gilgit also feeds back into the 
Kashmir dispute. Thus, local nationalism that postulates the nation of 
Gilgit-Baltistan as distinct from Pakistan, as well as from Kashmir, and 
which is entitled to self-determination, or at least real autonomy, and that 
thereby challenges the conventional framing of the Kashmir conflict, also 
derives from the experience of Pakistan’s divisive politics of religion. This 
nationalism proposes to overcome such divisions through the identification 
with a nation that – unlike Pakistan – is not based on religious affiliation in 
the first place.  
 
 
SPACE AND PLACE, MOBILITY AND MOBILISATION
 
The sectarian figuration in Gilgit is linked intimately and in multiple ways 
with issues of space and mobility. Sectarianisation is first of all the sectari-
anisation of places. This started with Wazir-e-Wazarat Sardar Mohammad 
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Akbar Khan in the early 20th century, who assigned separate places for Shia 
and Sunni ritual gatherings. Conflict over the Ashura julus in the 1970s was 
essentially over movement and space, whereby Sunnis considered the 
movement of the Shia julus near to their mosque an infringement on their 
space, while Shias insisted on their right to move across the city space. 
Nonetheless, through the ongoing dynamics of polarisation the urban space 
of Gilgit has become increasingly subject to sectarian division. Polarisation 
implies sectarian place-making and the increasing congruence of group 
boundaries and spatial boundaries. Many parts of the city have become 
marked as either Sunni or Shia space, in which the movement of members 
of the respective other group is considered unsafe. This is not only crucial 
for quotidian movement, since many people have moved house in order to 
leave places that they consider unsafe. Movement is restricted especially in 
times of tension, but a considerable degree of (self-)restriction remains ef-
fective also when an acute period of conflict is over. Furthermore, violent 
events are linked directly with movement, as people need to move in order 
to attack. Accordingly, the authorities try to control space and movement 
through a dense network of checkpoints and the imposition of curfews, i.e. 
prohibiting people from moving outside of their house, in periods of vio-
lence. The loss of the middle-ground in the process of polarisation means 
that neutral sites have become reduced and contested; antagonists try to 
mark neutral places as their own space. Beyond literal movement in physi-
cal space, the Shia-Sunni issue is also linked with issues of mobilisation in 
social and political space. On the one hand, actors have to be mobilised in 
order to side with the antagonists in one way or the other, but on the other 
hand this inter-sect bitterness is also employed as a means of mobilisation 
in other affairs such as elections.  
The close linkage between space/place and conflict is not accidental; ra-
ther, it is the consequence of the fact that all human action ‘takes place’ in 
places – even if in virtual ones. Place is a crucial resource for action and is 
therefore almost necessarily disputed in cases of unrest. Disputes about 
places can take many forms, such as conflicts about territory and borders, 
or about the right to move or the right to stay. Thus, the relation between 
conflict and space/place is of course a dual one: conflicts take place in 
space and at particular places, but they are also about space and places that 
are claimed by the antagonists. Often, conflict is also inscribed in places 
through symbolic markings or the drawing of physical boundaries. Similar-
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ly, movement and mobility are not only significant aspects of conflict ac-
tion, but they are also affected by conflict.  
I think a brief note on the relation of ‘space’ and ‘place’ is required 
here. Tim Ingold (2009) is right, in that there is no ‘space’ in practice: as 
soon as action ‘takes place’, ‘space’ is converted into concrete places – it is 
appropriated as particular places. Movement does not take place in space 
but from place to place. Conceiving of place as ‘space’ is therefore the phi-
losophers’ fallacy – the fallacy of those philosophers who ‘take the people 
out,’ to refer to Ingold’s beautiful definition of anthropology as “philoso-
phy with the people in” (Ingold 1992: 695-6). Still, I think, we need a word 
on the abstract condition of space – a kind of pre-social notion. Turning In-
gold against Lefebvre (1991), we could suggest that space is never con-
structed, because as soon as it is constructed, i.e. subject to social action, it 
becomes a place(s). Consequentially, space is not contested – except in ab-




THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS VOLUME
 
Issues of space and place, of movement and mobility, are the common de-
nominators for the contributors to this volume, who deal with contested 
places and movements, including land as the most concrete place as an ob-
ject of dispute, with the difficulty of mobilising resources in marginalised 
spaces, and with the effects of displacement from a contested border zone.  
Aksana Ismailbekova’s contribution, Shifting Borders: Coping Strate-
gies of Inhabitants in the Aftermath of the Osh Conflict, Kyrgyzstan, is 
about the ‘ethnic’ division of Kyrgyzstan’s second-largest city as a conse-
quence of violent conflict. She analyses how Kyrgyz and Uzbek inhabitants 
coped with the ‘ethnic’ violence that occurred in 1990 and 2010. Historical-
ly, Uzbeks had largely been city-dwellers, while the Kyrgyz lived as no-
mads; yet, the two groups were not always completely separate, as there 
were intermarriages, and to some extent ‘ethnic’ identity was a matter of 
economic specialisation. Soviet processes of modernisation, which focused 
especially on the development of cities, brought both groups closer together 
and separated them at the same time. Driven by Soviet urban planning, 
Kyrgyz moved into the city, often occupying ‘modern’ apartment buildings 
that replaced ‘traditional’ Uzbek neighbourhoods, while Uzbeks were 
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pushed towards the margins. Thus, land became contentious and was overt-
ly ethnicised, especially in the post-Soviet period. Complex social relations 
were increasingly reduced to a Kyrgyz-Uzbek dichotomy, and especially 
the violence of 2010 triggered the further displacement of Uzbeks – often to 
neighbouring Uzbekistan – and consolidated the Kyrgyz domination of 
Osh. For Uzbeks, moving out of mixed neighbourhoods was a kind of sur-
vival strategy. Following a Kyrgyz real-estate agent, who took advantage of 
the Uzbeks’ urge to sell their properties in order to move to safer areas, the 
chapter provides insights into the dynamics behind the spatial separation of 
Uzbek and Kyrgyz. Besides housing, segregation also affects businesses 
and even mosques. The city major’s attempts to promote ethnically mixed 
‘friendship houses’ could not stop the dynamics of segregation, and both 
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz felt compelled instead to take the side of their respec-
tive groups, in order to avoid further violence. Interestingly, however, these 
segregation dynamics did not affect all parts of Osh equally, and some 
neighbourhoods were able to prevent violence – and therefore segregation – 
by stressing a shared identity of “being from Osh” at the expense of ethnic 
particularism.  
In his article, Understanding Mobilisation Processes in Conflict 
through Framing: The Case of inter-communal Conflict in the Batken Prov-
ince, Kyrgyzstan, Khushbakht Hojiev analyses the dynamics of a local con-
flict between Tajiks and Kyrgyz in a village of southern Kyrgyzstan. What 
started as a brawl between a few young men threatened to escalate into a 
larger, violent fight in which the antagonists literally opposed one another 
in space. Nevertheless, efforts made by local elders at mediation, and later 
the arrival of security forces, prevented this escalation. Hojiev asks why 
this conflict was considered locally as an ethnic conflict, and he applies 
framing analysis, derived from social movement theory, to this case. Fol-
lowing Hartmut Esser, he defines framing as an inter-subjective process of 
definition, perception and identification of a conflict situation and argues 
that a focus on framing helps to bridge the ‘instrumentalist-interpretivist’ 
divide in conflict analysis and to emphasise an action and process-oriented 
perspective. Framing is an active and constitutive process that draws on 
broader cognitive models and public sentiments. Both Kyrgyz and Tajiks 
applied an ethnic frame to the incident in question, relating to the broader 
model of the titular nation, from the Kyrgyz perspective, and to the model 
of minority, from the Tajik point of view. Hojiev points out that especially 
three referencing mechanisms were significant in the process of framing: 
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the use of the symbolic dimension of violence, othering and alignment with 
the larger political discourse, especially the ethno-nationalist discourse at 
the national level of Kyrgyzstan. Here also reference to the violent conflict 
in Osh plays an important role, though framing is not necessarily uncon-
tested. In this particular case, elders and representatives of the local authori-
ties were able to reframe the incident successfully as an ordinary tussle be-
tween young men. Framing is a complex process, the analysis of which 
helps to improve understanding of conflict situations.  
Taking a different methodological and theoretical approach, Jan Koeh-
ler asks about the role of social order and social institutions in relation to 
conflicts. In Institution-Centred Conflict Research: A Methodological Ap-
proach and its Application in East Afghanistan, drawing on classical con-
tributions to conflict theory from Coser and Dahrendorf about the question 
whether conflict is disruptive or integrative in the first place, Koehler ar-
gues that the institutionalisation of unavoidable conflicts as a constitutive 
element of society fosters social cohesion. However, while other authors 
have drawn this conclusion for ‘modern’, industrialised and state-centred 
societies, he sets out to test this proposition for the rather volatile social set-
ting in Afghanistan. Asking how conflicts are processed, what role institu-
tions play in conflict and how conflict-processing impacts on social order, 
Koehler draws on material from a larger, comparative research process but 
focuses in this contribution on a case of land-grabbing in a district of the 
Nangarhar province of north-eastern Afghanistan. The dispute is about a 
piece of land that was owned by a clan but then claimed by a military 
commander. In the vicissitudes of Afghanistan’s political situation, land 
ownership changed sides several time. The case involves different institu-
tions, such as jirgas and formal land titles, and strategies, such as patronage 
and self-help. The development of the conflict shows that power and force 
are not enough to secure land: claims have to respect certain rules. Thus, 
the powerful commander also took steps to secure formal title to the land in 
question. Koehler reaches the conclusion that local conflict-processing in-
stitutions survive war and social fragmentation. The case indicates that vio-
lence is constrained even in situations of gross power difference, if in the 
long run the interests of the more powerful party require acceptance within 
the institutional context. However, procedures such as jirgas legitimate 
claims rather than contain violence, and so they are more an instrument of 
those in power than a means to limit and control such power. 
INTRODUCTION | 27
Nick Miszak’s chapter on Land-based Conflict in Afghanistan: On the 
Right of Pre-emption (shuf’a) as ‘back-channel’ Diplomacy and a Show of 
Indignation analyses another case of land conflict. Land is the most im-
portant object of dispute in the area, as it is a significant resource for peo-
ple’s social position and power. Furthermore, it is linked closely with the 
concept of namus, signifying properties that men have to defend in order to 
protect their honour. Land has become particularly conflictual in Afghani-
stan, as after the beginning of the US-led military intervention the country 
was literally flooded with international funds and many Afghan refugees re-
turned home. In a case study, again from the province of Nagrahar in East-
ern Afghanistan, Miszak focuses in particular on the role of the right of pre-
emption (shuf’a) in land conflicts. The conflict in question relates to a piece 
of land close to the Torkham border crossing with Pakistan, the most im-
portant entry point for NATO supplies to Afghanistan, which is therefore of 
particular value for business. Rumours that a township would be construct-
ed in this place further enhanced the value of the plot in question. In 2002, 
a group of people called Pekhawal started to construct shops on this plot 
overnight, knowing that eviction is difficult once labour and materials have 
been invested in a piece of land. The next day, a group of Mohmandara 
went to the location and tried to stop construction work, claiming that the 
Pekhawals’ occupation was illegal. As neighbours of the plot, the 
Mohmandara claimed to be shuf’adar, which meant that they would reserve 
the right to benefit from the land to them. However, through the interven-
tion of the police, only a kind of standstill between both parties could be 
achieved. In the changing constellations of power the Mohmandara did not 
pursue their case through the courts (neither of the groups had a formal title 
for the land) or a jirga but sought rather to influence the executive through 
roadblocks and other action, thereby arousing public interest by what 
Miszak calls ‘back-channel diplomacy’ – a series of meetings with different 
politicians who the Mohmandaras tried to convince of their own perspec-
tive. The Mohmandaras’ campaign rested especially on their interpretation 
of the right of pre-emption, shuf’a, an important concept of Islamic proper-
ty law. Nevertheless, the occupying Pekhawals also produced historical 
narratives, in order to establish their own right of pre-emption and to reject 
that of the Mohmandaras. Miszak details how narratives and counter-
narratives are constructed. Thus, both parties accept the general validity of 
shuf’a and the relation to the land becomes the source of the legitimacy of 
claims. Although after more than ten years the conflict is still not solved, 
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Miszak argues that, in spite of all narratives to the contrary, Afghanistan is 
by no means simply a country where violence and lawlessness reign su-
preme. Corroborating Jan Koehler’s findings, Miszak concludes that while 
a threat to use force is often present in conflicts, force does not overrule le-
gitimacy, and it is legitimacy in the first place that people attempt to con-
struct for their claims.  
Katja Mielke’s chapter, Not in in the Master Plan: Dimensions of Ex-
clusion in Kabul, takes a different approach. Instead of focusing on a par-
ticular conflict, she analyses a conflictual field, namely urban infrastructur-
al development in District 13 on the outskirts of Afghanistan’s capital city. 
“D13” is a rapidly urbanising district, mostly populated by Hazaras, which 
has been largely ignored by Kabul’s infrastructural development. The 
Hazara inhabitants transfer their identity as a discriminated-against minori-
ty in Afghanistan onto the urban district. For them, their state of being dis-
advantaged and marginalised is epitomised in the fact that D13 has not been 
included in Kabul’s master plan, which in turn is regarded as the reason 
why the municipality shows little interest in the district’s development. The 
Hazaras’ perception of exclusion has been exacerbated by rapid construc-
tion of a township of Kuchis in D13 which is well-serviced and supported 
by international donor agencies. Mielke considers D13 as a ‘core figura-
tion’ which is part of larger figurations at the scale of the city and beyond. 
Asking how residents and representatives struggle regarding access to ser-
vices and resources, she analyses the positionalities and relationships of ac-
tors that hinder or enable such access vis-à-vis the at-best disinterested mu-
nicipality. In particular, she discusses the successful work of a rather young 
neighbourhood head (wakil-e guzar), who has been able to secure a number 
of projects for his area. Mielke shows that this wakil-e guzar is well-
connected beyond D13 and can draw on national and even international 
support. Following Elias she argues that power imbalances cannot be re-
duced to ethnic differences, and she concludes that dynamics within D13 
cannot be understood in an isolated manner: processes in the core figuration 
do not make sense if the wider figurational context – the social, spatial and 
temporal interdependencies in which the core figuration is imbedded – is 
ignored. 
With Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra’s chapter, Negotiating Space in 
the Conflict Zone of Kashmir: The Borderlanders’ Perspective, we enter in-
to a pervasive long-term conflict, namely the Kashmir dispute. Deploring 
the fact that the discourse on Kashmir centres on security issues and the 
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state-perspectives of India and Pakistan, Mahapatra turns to the people who 
live(d) in the immediate vicinity on the Line of Control (LoC) between In-
dian- and Pakistan-controlled parts of the erstwhile princely state and who 
are immediately affected by violence, division and insecurity. These ‘bor-
derlanders’ are not part of the mainstream discourse on Kashmir. Maha-
patra argues that the border in Kashmir needs to be problematised and that 
the perspective of the borderlanders is crucial to this end. The article focus-
es on borderlanders on the Indian side of the LoC and is based on fieldwork 
that took place both at the border and in a number of refugee camps. Draw-
ing on Martinez, Mahapatra analyses the border zone of Kashmir as an ‘al-
ienated borderland’ characterised by most unfavourable conditions for 
those who live on the border. Based mostly on interviews, he describes the 
conditions of the borderlanders, focusing especially on the experiences of 
war, including the fortification of the LoC, as well as (multiple) displace-
ment and life in the camps. In conclusion he points out that Kashmir’s bor-
ders contradict much of the current border discourse, which focuses much 
more on the permeability and flexibility of borders than on their divisive-
ness and rigidity.  
Through Emma Varley’s chapter Exclusionary Infrastructures: Crisis 
and the Rise of Sectarian Hospitals in Northern Pakistan, we re-enter 
Gilgit. Varley analyses the effects of Shia-Sunni sectarianism on Gilgit’s 
healthcare system, pointing out how healthcare itself has been sectarian-
ised. She discusses especially events that were the consequence of the as-
sassination of the Shia Imam Syed Zia-ud-din Rizvi in January 2005 and 
the subsequent retaliatory violence of Shias against Sunnis in the town. 
This violence also targeted Sunni doctors and patients at Gilgit’s District 
Headquarters Hospital (DHQ), situated in a Shia majority neighbourhood. 
Although the DHQ theoretically offered its services to all people in Gilgit, 
Sunnis considered it an insecure place and were practically excluded. Thus, 
while public healthcare in Gilgit was originally insufficient anyway, access 
became even worse for Sunnis. Nevertheless, Shia patients also suffered 
because Sunni medical personnel often refused to work at the DHQ for lack 
of security. In order to overcome the lack of healthcare for Sunnis, a sepa-
rate hospital was established in 2005 – on a private initiative – in the Sunni 
neighbourhood of Kashrote. This Kashrote hospital was subsequently ex-
tended and received government funding, yet essential facilities for diag-
nostics and treatment were lacking. Thus, the medical infrastructure of 
Gilgit became highly sectarianised, whereby the hospital sites became 
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strictly associated with one or the other sect. Varley argues that the devel-
opment of sect-specific medical infrastructure strongly affects everyday life 
in the town, thus exacerbating insecurity and contributing further to the lack 
of efficient medical services. This is particularly so after (or rather be-
tween) acute periods of tension, and therefore she calls the usual distinction 
between conflict and post-conflict states into question. The sectarianisation 
of healthcare demonstrates the state’s inability to provide public security, 
and instead of being neutral sites of service, the hospitals serve as ‘sites for 
identity formation and the emergence of novel forms of sectarian sociality’, 
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